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I.

In the waning decades of the twentieth century, there was broad
academic and policy agreement on how the U.S. monetary system
worked and on the appropriate role of the Federal Reserve (“Fed”) in
making it work. Money was created and injected into the economy in
two principal ways: (1) the Fed would buy U.S. Treasury securities and,
in the process, credit the sellers’ bank account with new dollars; 1 and
∗
Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to
Christine Desan, Jodi Short, and students in Harvard Law School’s Money Design and Inequality
seminar for helpful comments.
RESERVE
BANK
OF
N.Y.,
1.
Large
Scale
Asset
Purchases,
FED.
https://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/programs-archive/large-scale-asset-purchases (last visited
Oct. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/XJ96-4NAA] (“Outright purchases or sales of Treasury securities
were used historically as a tool to manage the supply of bank reserves to maintain conditions
consistent with the federal funds target rate set by the FOMC.”). While Treasuries were the
primary asset the Fed bought and sold, it would also routinely transact in “federal agency
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(2) private banks would lend to private borrowers, similarly crediting
the borrowers’ accounts with new dollars. 2 Most of this bank-created
money was, thanks to federal deposit insurance, nondefaultable,
effectively enjoying the “full and faith and credit” of the federal
government. 3 While the Fed faced no theoretical limit on its ability to
create dollars, private banks were constrained, inter alia, by “reserve”
requirements—the need to maintain a percentage of deposit account
liabilities in the form of either vault cash or their own reserve account
with the Federal Reserve. 4 But in each case, dollars were created ex
nihilo; neither the Fed nor the private banks were lending or spending
already-created dollars, as other lenders and purchasers must do, but
rather creating them with a keystroke by crediting the accounts of their
counterparty borrowers or sellers.
The Federal Reserve controlled price levels and the supply of
money with targeted sales and purchases of Treasuries through socalled “open market operations.” 5 These purchases or sales would
augment or diminish the supply of bank reserves in the system, which,
due to reserve requirements, augmented or diminished banks’ ability to
create (more) money. 6 In implementing open market operations, the
Fed would target the “fed funds” rate: that is, the overnight rate that
banks would charge each other in the interbank lending market. 7 By
adding to or subtracting from the reserves in the system, the Fed would
affect supply and demand in this market, thereby shifting the fed funds
securities,” including securities issued by government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae.
See, e.g., Cheryl L. Edwards, Open Market Operations in the 1990s, 83 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN
859, 859 (1997) (“[P]urchases and sales of U.S. Treasury and federal agency securities largely
determine the federal funds rate.”). And as part of its broader operations, it acquired other assets
in limited quantities, such as gold certificates, IMF special drawing rights, foreign currencies, and
discount window loans. See Saule T. Omarova, The People’s Ledger: How to Democratize Money
and Finance the Economy, 74 VAND. L. REV. 1231, 1244 (2021).
2.
Frances Coppola, How Bank Lending Really Creates Money, and Why The Magic Money
(Oct.
31,
2017),
Tree
Is
Not
Cost
Free,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/10/31/how-bank-lending-really-creates-moneyand-why-the-magic-money-tree-is-not-cost-free/?sh=25df5ec83073 [https://perma.cc/2ZEF-KEGK]
(“Money is created when banks lend.”).
3.
See generally A Brief History of Deposit Insurance in the United States, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP. (Sept. 1998), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/brief/brhist.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U928E6C].
4.
See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 1, at 860. Note that in the throes of the market disruptions
caused by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the Fed, concerned that banks
wouldn’t be making enough loans, set the reserve requirement at zero. See Reserve Requirements,
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.,
BD.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/4HRX-E3KZ] (“As announced on March 15, 2020, the Board reduced reserve
requirement ratios to zero percent effective March 26, 2020.”).
5.
See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 1.
6.
See Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 772–86 (2018).
7.
Id.
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rate up or down as the economic outlook demanded—and this shift in
interest rate would then seep into the wider economy. 8 Because excess
reserves were relatively scarce in this system, the Fed could affect the
fed funds rate with open market operations that were quite modest
relative to the overall size of the market or of its own balance sheet. 9
Furthermore, the Fed was “independent,” and this was seen as
a good thing: direct political control of money would, it was thought,
inexorably lead to inflation. 10 As economic historian Adam Tooze writes,
As the idea emerged in the 20th century, central bank independence meant above all
freedom from direction by the short-term concerns of politicians. Instead, central bankers
would be allowed to set monetary policy as they saw fit, usually with a view not only to
bringing down inflation but to permanently installing a regime of confidence in monetary
stability—what economists call anchoring price expectations. 11

In this model, the Fed was a countermajoritarian institution.
The model “rested on a series of assumptions about the economy (there
was a trade-off between inflation and unemployment), global financial
markets (they had the power to punish), politics (overspending was the
preferred vote-getting strategy), and society at large (there were
substantial social forces pushing for high employment regardless
of inflation).” 12
While far from perfect, 13 this system had its virtues. 14 The world
has changed profoundly, however, and this model fails to capture key

8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10. Adam Tooze, The Death of the Central Bank Myth, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 13, 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/european-central-bank-myth-monetary-policy-german-courtruling/ [https://perma.cc/G6JB-VQ3T] (“The [central] bank was to act as a countermajoritarian
institution. It was charged with doing whatever it took to achieve just one objective: hold inflation
low. Giving the central bank a quasi-constitutional position would deter reckless politicians from
attempting expansive policies.”).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. A primary flaw was that certain geographic regions and demographic groups were—as
they remain today —underserved by the banking system. See, e.g., Christine Desan, How to Spend
a Trillion Dollars (2021) (on file with author) (“The fact that certain regions and income groups
are starved of bank credit argues against the adequacy of the system” and “[a] ‘substantial
literature’ documents that banks disfavor financing for minority-owned firms (along with small
businesses and women-owned businesses).”); see also FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 FDIC
NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS
1
(2017),
https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TC24-P359]
(“Approximately 8.4 million U.S. households, made up of 14.1 million adults and 6.4 million
children, were unbanked in 2017.”).
14. For good accounts of some of the virtues of this system, see MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY
PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 149–53 (2016) (providing a theoretical account of
why Fed purchase of government securities combined with loans extended by heavily regulated
private banks was superior to a number of other alternatives); GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE
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features of the way money now works in the United States, as well as
of the roles and functions the Fed has assumed in recent years.
The most important change has been in the ways dollars are
created and injected into the economy. First, in the period leading up to
the global financial crisis (“GFC”) of 2008, financial institutions that did
not have bank charters and were not legally permitted to issue
deposits 15 nevertheless issued vast quantities of close functional
substitutes for deposits, including instruments such as money market
fund shares, repurchase agreements, and commercial paper. 16 These
instruments served as money for their claimants, just as the money in
my bank savings deposit account is money for me. 17 This was the socalled “shadow banking system,” and these were the instruments most
directly implicated in the GFC, as well as in the COVID-19-related
market disruptions of March 2020, as claimants panicked and tried to
cash out of these deposit substitutes en masse. 18
Second, in dealing with the GFC and its aftermath, the Fed no
longer confined itself primarily to Treasuries in creating money: it
began to buy and lend against large quantities of other financial
assets. 19 This trend only accelerated with the market disruptions at the
INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007, at 54 (2010) (describing the period described by this model
as a panic-free “Quiet Period” in U.S. history).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(2); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l)(3) (defining “deposit” as, among other
things, “money received or held by a bank” or as “the credit given for money or its equivalent
received or held by a bank” (emphasis added)). Reference to the “issuance” of deposits reinforces
the important but often overlooked fact that banks create money when they credit a borrower’s
bank account in making a loan.
16. See, e.g., John Crawford, Lesson Unlearned? Regulatory Reform and Financial Stability
in the Trump Administration, 117 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 127, 134–35 (2017) (describing shadow
banking and deposit substitutes).
17. Christine Desan provides a good explanation of how shadow banking instruments expand
the money supply:
[T]he debt instruments at [shadow banking’s] core are legally engineered to produce
liquidity. Note, first, how those instruments expand available liquidity. As for cash
investors, they are holding contracts—the short-term, routinely renewed liabilities—
that are almost as good as cash. After all, those contracts are “‘pay-on-demand”‘
instruments, returning a contracted amount if not rolled over; those holding them
appropriately book them as “‘cash equivalents.”‘ As for the shadow banks, they have the
borrowed cash and are using that cash at the same time. The cash and the cash-like
credit (the overnight contract, for example) function together to expand the money
supply de facto.
Christine Desan, Money’s Design Elements: Debt, Liquidity, and the Pledge of Value from Medieval
Coin to Modern ‘Repo’, 38 BANKING L. & FIN. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
18. See, e.g., Crawford, supra note 16, at 134–35 (describing the central role of shadow banks
in the GFC); Rajdeep Sangupta & Fei Xue, The Global Pandemic and Run on Shadow Banks, FED.
RESERVE
BANK
KAN.
CITY:
ECON.
BULLETIN
(May
11,
2020),
https://www.kansascityfed.org/research/economic-bulletin/global-pandemic-run-shadow-banks2020/ [https://perma.cc/5Y4R-GWCW] (describing the run on deposit equivalents in March 2020).
19. See, e.g., DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, FINANCIAL CRISIS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO THE
LAWS, REGULATIONS AND CONTRACTS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) (describing the array of
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start of the COVID-19 pandemic. 20 The expansion into other asset
categories unavoidably draws the Fed into playing a more direct role
not just in how much money there is, but in how it is allocated. Further,
as the Fed bought or financed these assets, it injected unprecedented
quantities of “base” money 21 into the banking system, which was now
awash in reserves. As a result, the Fed could no longer rely on the tool
it had employed to modulate interest rates and the money supply—
namely, modest open market operations to affect supply and demand in
the fed funds market. 22 It therefore turned to “directly administered”
rates, paying interest on reserves to a privileged clientele—banks—
permitted to maintain reserve accounts at the Fed, which would then
set a floor on the fed funds rate. 23
A related major change is that central bank independence has
taken on a new hue. In describing the extraordinary measures adopted
not just by the Fed, but also by the Bank of Japan and the European
Central Bank in response to crises of recent decades, Adam Tooze
writes:
These efforts proved effective in delivering a measure of financial stability. They made
central bankers into heroes. But they also fundamentally altered the meaning of
independence. In the paradigm that emerged from the crises of the 1970s, independence
meant restraint and respect for the boundaries of delegated authority. In the new era, it
had more to do with independence of action and initiative. More often than not, it meant
the central bank single-handedly saving the day. 24

immediate tools with which the Fed responded to the GFC, including unprecedented use of Section
13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to lend to nonbank financial institutions); Large-Scale Asset
Purchases, supra note 1 (describing the shift in the maturity and make-up of the Fed’s asset
purchases during periods of quantitative easing); Overnight Reverse Repurchase Agreement
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FED.
RESERVE
SYS.,
Facility,
BD.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/overnight-reverse-repurchase-agreements.htm
(last visited November 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/88PK-6NUY] (describing the program through
which the Fed provides overnight secured loans to eligible financial institutions); Colleen Baker,
The Federal Reserve’s Use of International Swap Lines, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 603 (2013) (describing the
Fed’s program to lend dollars to foreign central banks, structured as currency swaps).
20. See generally Lev Menand, The Federal Reserve and the 2020 Economic and Financial
Crisis, 26 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 295 (2021) (describing the array of programs through which the
Fed responded to the economic and financial disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic).
21. Base money comprises physical currency and reserve accounts held at the Federal
RSRV.
BANK
OF
ST.
LOUIS,
Reserve.
See
Adjusted
Monetary
Base,
FED.
https://www.stlouisfed.org/financial-crisis/data/adjusted-monetary-base (last visited November
11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/2FMA-6JB7].
22. See Ricks, supra note 6, at 772–86.
23. Id. at 786–801. Note that for an extended period of time, to the surprise of almost
everyone, the fed funds rate fell below interest on reserves. Id. (explaining how and why this
anomaly arose).
24. Tooze, supra note 10.
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Again, the Fed’s role became, in fact if not in popular
understanding, more directly political. 25
As a partial response to this changing landscape, some scholars
and policy thinkers (including this author) have in recent years
proposed democratizing the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet by
allowing all American citizens and businesses to bank directly with the
Fed, providing them with so-called “FedAccounts.” 26 It is argued that
this would, inter alia, promote inclusion by providing basic banking
services to the unbanked and underbanked; 27 promote stability by
“crowding out” shadow banking instruments, which remain the greatest
source of instability in our financial system; 28 and strengthen the Fed’s
monetary toolkit by allowing it to pay interest on reserves to everyone,
so that it would not have to rely on banks to “pass through” the rate to
the broader economy. 29
Such proposals would also, if implemented effectively, provide a
way for the Fed to build credibility with the populace at large, without
demanding discretionary distributive judgments that might invite
backlash. These proposals tended not, however, to address head-on the
political dimensions of the Fed’s increasingly direct impact on allocation
when it creates money.
In her rich, provocative article The People’s Ledger: How to
Democratize Money and Finance the Economy, Professor Saule
Omarova takes these proposals to task for their failure to wrestle with
these distributive issues, and argues that a more comprehensive
approach is needed—one which would democratize the asset side of the
Fed’s balance sheet as well as well as its liabilities. 30 Other key
departures from prior FedAccounts proposals include mandatory
migration away from private bank accounts 31 and the possibility of so25. A final change worth mentioning is that the percentage of payments carried out
electronically, rather than by cash or check, increased dramatically, creating an opportunity to
weave together and improve the efficiency of a fragmented national payment system. See, e.g., The
2019 Federal Reserve Payments Study, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/2019-December-The-Federal-ReservePayments-Study.htm (last updated January 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/V6UW-3X65] (“In 2018, for
the first time, the number of ACH debit transfers (16.6 billion) exceeded the number of check
payments (14.5 billion). In 2000, in contrast, the number of ACH debit transfers stood at 2.1 billion
compared to 42.6 billion check payments.”).
26. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, John Crawford, & Lev Menand, FedAccounts: Digital Dollars, 89
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (2021).
27. Id. at 125–30.
28. Id. at 132–35.
29. Id. at 135–37.
30. Omarova, supra note 1.
31. Id. at 1265 (with relatively minor carve-outs, Omarova “advocates full migration of
demand deposits onto the Fed’s balance sheet”). Most other proposals would make FedAccounts
optional.
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called “helicopter drops”—that is, creating money by crediting people’s
accounts without a corresponding purchase or loan—as a tool of
monetary policy. 32
The People’s Ledger is a wonderfully thoughtful, informed, and
creative contribution to the debate over our monetary system and what
reforms may be called for; there is much to like and even more to learn
from a careful reading of it. It is thought-provoking in the best way: I
continue to return to its themes and arguments, pondering them and
oscillating between persuasion and critique. There are, however,
central features of its argument that ultimately leave me unpersuaded.
The People’s Ledger is meant to offer “a blueprint for reform that
would radically democratize access to money and control over financial
flows in the nation’s economy.” 33 Admitting that radical reform of the
current system demands consideration, and that democratizing money
is desirable, in this Response, I will critically evaluate the set of
proposals put forward in The People’s Ledger along the dimensions of
radicalism and democratization, while also suggesting reasons to
embrace or reject parts of the program. What The People’s Ledger adds
to prior FedAccounts proposals, and what grounds its claims to
radicalism, lies first and foremost in its call for fundamental changes to
how money is created. To this end, the Article proposes four “new”
methods of money creation. I will suggest that two of these methods are
unobjectionable but, at core, not new; that a third method is new but
unadvisable; and that the fourth proposed method is new and radical,
but possibly not radical enough. With respect to certain other issues The
People’s Ledger addresses—shadow banking and determining the rates
at which the Fed would lend to banks—I suggest that the proposal
needs to be more radical. Finally, I will explore what strikes me as a
deep ambiguity in The People’s Ledger with respect to what
democratizing the Fed’s balance sheet means, or should mean, and its
implications for the Fed’s popular legitimacy, as well as the quality of
its policymaking going forward.
I. MONEY CREATION
The People’s Ledger positions itself as a radical reimagining of
the monetary system, particularly with respect to the allocative effects
of money creation. Professor Omarova identifies four “new” means by
which money would be injected into the economy in her reimagined
32. Id. at 1259–63.
33. Id. at 1234–36.
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system: (1) purchase by the Fed of securities issued by a new National
Investment Authority (“NIA”), focused on public infrastructure
projects; 34 (2) so-called “new discount window” (“NDW”) loans by the
Fed to private banks, to allow banks to continue making consumer and
business loans after they have lost their deposits to FedAccounts; 35 (3)
expanded open market operations by the Fed, in which it would hold a
broad market portfolio and intervene to short sell classes of assets that
are overvalued and prop up asset classes that are undervalued; 36 and
(4) direct “helicopter drops” into individual accounts. 37
In terms of monetary architecture, I will argue that the first two
amount to a perpetuation of the current system, with some of the
furniture rearranged; the third is radical but unadvisable; and the
fourth is radical but only half-explored in the Article.
A. The NIA and NDW
The question of whether a reform is new or radical is obviously
distinct from the question of whether it is desirable, but labels may
affect the political reception of proposed reforms. And on its own terms,
students of monetary architecture may find it worth exploring the ways
in which key aspects of The People’s Ledger mark a continuation of,
rather than a departure from, current structures. As noted above,
traditional methods of money creation involved (1) the Federal Reserve
purchasing debt from government agencies and (2) private banks
extending loans. The purchase of NIA securities falls into the first
category; NDW loans falls into the second.
With respect to the purchase of NIA securities, nothing prevents
Congress from funding public infrastructure projects by issuing
Treasuries, and nothing under the “traditional” Fed model would
prevent the Fed from buying those Treasuries. 38 At its core, then, it is
difficult to distinguish this first “new” method of money creation from a
simple prescription that Congress should have different priorities. This
is not to gainsay either the wisdom of more public infrastructure
spending in the current economy 39 or the practical advantages of setting
34. Id. at 1272–75.
35. Id. at 1270–72 (noting that NDW loans would be available not just to banks but to other
“qualifying lending institutions” as well).
36. Id. at 1275–76.
37. Id. at 1259–63.
38. Likewise, nothing in the traditional Fed model would prevent it from purchasing
securities issued by a federal agency newly established by Congress; purchase of securities issued
by government-sponsored enterprises has long been part of the Fed’s toolkit. See supra note 1.
39. It is also worth noting that while there are doubtless vast opportunities for valuable
infrastructure projects in the United States today, at a certain point it may become hard to find

2022]

RADICALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN
MONETARY SYSTEM REFORM

63

up an independent authority to carry out that mission—but neither of
these implicates a fundamental shift in the monetary system.
A similar observation applies to Omarova’s emphasis on the
importance of coordination between the Fed and fiscal authorities
responsible for implementing the NIA. She writes of such coordination
that “[i]n this tangible way, abandoning the illusory notion of
technocratic neutrality as the basis of sound monetary policy creates an
important opening for a more deliberate and transparent incorporation
of democratically established public policy priorities into the Fed’s
operations.” 40 I argue below that making the Fed more overtly political
could have significant drawbacks, 41 but one may note here that close
coordination between fiscal and monetary authorities has been a
hallmark of U.S. policymaking in recent years. 42
The NDW loans would similarly perpetuate the current system
of bank lending as a mode of money creation, albeit with an extra step.
In the current system, banks do not need to borrow from the Fed or from
anyone else before they create new money: they simply credit their
borrowers’ accounts. 43 With NDW, money creation would still depend
on banks lending to businesses and consumers, but the banks would
have to borrow the (newly created) dollars from the Fed first. Of course,
what would necessitate the ramped up use of the discount window is
new—namely, the introduction of FedAccounts. But the Fed’s reliance
on banks to allocate money creation to creditworthy consumers and
businesses is not new. (And the discount window, of course, is one of the
oldest tools at the Fed’s disposal—though as Omarova notes, in normal
projects that pass the cost-benefit test. See, e.g., Gabriel Wildau, China Infrastructure Investment
Model Under Fire, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/b1d9177c-7650-11e6bf48-b372cdb1043a [https://perma.cc/3867-Y92E] (citing researchers who argue that “[m]ore than
half of Chinese infrastructure projects have ‘destroyed, not generated’ economic value as costs have
been larger than the benefits”).
40. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1281–82.
41. See infra Part IV.
42. See, e.g., Salesha Mohsin, Mnuchin Defends Work With Fed as Democrats Fault Funds
Shift (Nov. 25, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-25/mnuchin-defendsrecord-of-close-coordination-with-fed-in-crisis (“ ‘Powell and I speak multiple times a week. We
would both characterize that we have an excellent relationship,’ Mnuchin said in an interview
Wednesday. Treasury and the Fed have been ‘incredibly coordinated on the execution of the Cares
Act facilities,’ he said, referring to the federal stimulus law.”); James B. Stewart, Eight Days: The
Battle to Save the American Financial System, NEW YORKER (Sept. 14, 2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/21/eight-days
[https://perma.cc/X8GJ-BEPG]
(describing the close coordination between the Fed and the Department of the Treasury during the
critical period around Lehman Brothers’ failure in September 2008).
43. It is worth noting that while reserve requirements are currently set at zero, supra note
4, banks face other liquidity requirements, as well as capital requirements, which set some
constraints on their ability to create new money. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.10 (Minimum Capital
Requirements); 12 C.F.R. § 249.10 (Liquidity Coverage Ratio).
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times banks rarely avail themselves of it. 44) Again, whether NDW is
new and radical is distinct from whether the NDW is a good idea; I
believe it could be an important part of the Fed’s toolkit if FedAccounts
were adopted. 45
B. OMO Plus
The proposed expanded open market operations (“OMO Plus” 46)
aimed at correcting mispriced asset classes would, on the other hand,
mark a radical departure from the traditional model. In one sense, it
marks a recognition that the Fed has gotten much more deeply
entwined in markets since the GFC than many casual observers might
realize. 47 While some may feel uncomfortable with these interventions,
and believe it prudent for the Fed to scale back its market footprint, The
People’s Ledger suggests that the Fed should go all in. The primary goal
of OMO Plus would be to promote stability by shorting overpriced asset
classes—"such as mortgage-backed securities or technology stocks”—
and propping up underpriced asset classes. 48 This is a bold proposal to
address a real problem. I nevertheless remain unpersuaded that this
would be a wise project for three reasons, two of which touch on subjects
more fully explored below. First, while bubbles are never good, if we
address the fundamental cause of instability, we need not worry quite
as much about them. 49 The second point relates to the legitimacy of the
Fed in the public eye; short sellers are, whether justified or not, among
the most routinely reviled market actors. 50 It is hard to think of
anything that would do more to create resentment against the Fed
among politically powerful constituents in the United States than its
taking a direct short position on something like residential housing—
particularly because, given the Fed’s fire power, there would likely be
aspects of a self-fulfilling prophecy to any intervention it undertook.
Even setting these points aside, however, I am deeply skeptical
that the Fed would reliably make the right call ex ante about which
44. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1270 (“Banks . . . are generally reluctant to borrow from the
Fed because of the commonly described ‘stigma’ attached to discount window loans as a sign of the
borrowing banks’ diminished ability to access liquidity in the interbank loan market.”).
45. Indeed, my coauthors and I propose a version of NDW in earlier work. See Ricks et al.,
supra note 26, at 146.
46. Id. at 1275.
47. See supra note 19.
48. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1276.
49. See infra Part II.
50. See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, A New Wave of Vilifying Short Sellers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30shorts.html [https://perma.cc/M3UMB2ST].
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assets to short and which assets to prop up. While there were certainly
people warning that residential housing in the mid-aughts and tech
stocks at the turn of the millennium were overvalued, hindsight bias
may make it seem like these facts were, or should have been, more
obvious at the time. As Adam Tooze recounts in his history of the GFC,
Crashed, what preoccupied the most respected financial policy figures
in the mid-aughts was public debt, not subprime housing. 51 Would this
have led to a OMO Plus policy of shorting the Treasury market? Should
it have? One possible response is that we need better policymakers, but
this is cold comfort if we are trying to achieve change via structural
reform. (I am also skeptical, of course, that—even if such policymakers
exist—we could reliably identify them ex ante.) Another possible
response is that we shouldn’t be focused on the policymakers at all
here—this is a technical job, and we should rely on the Fed’s
nonpolitical staff to do it. 52 I would be curious to know, however, to what
degree staff at the Fed’s trading desk held (with high confidence) views
similar to, say, the heroes of Michael Lewis’s The Big Short or Gregory
Zuckerman’s The Greatest Trade Ever. 53 It is also worth querying
whether those who made riches by shorting the housing market leading
up to 2008 have consistently made correct market calls in the years
before or since. 54
In short, for a variety of reasons, I am skeptical of the wisdom of
adding OMO Plus to the Fed’s monetary toolkit.
C. Helicopter drops
Perhaps the most radical element of The People’s Ledger in
terms of monetary system design is the proposal to empower the Fed to
implement “helicopter drops” as a tool of monetary policy—that is,
simply disbursing cash to individuals and businesses without obtaining

51. ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISES CHANGED THE WORLD 42
(2018).
52. This could of course exacerbate the concerns about the political legitimacy of the Fed’s
actions. See infra Part IV.
53. These are two popular accounts of those who figured out how to bet against the housing
market in the mid-aughts, making huge profits in the process. MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT:
INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010); GREGORY ZUCKERMAN, THE GREATEST TRADE EVER: THE
BEHIND-THE-SCENES STORY OF HOW JOHN PAULSON DEFIED WALL STREET AND MADE FINANCIAL
HISTORY (2010).
54. See, e.g., Alexandra Stevenson & Matthew Goldstein, John Paulson’s Fall from Hedge
TIMES
(May
1,
2017),
Fund
Stardom,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/business/dealbook/john-paulsons-fall-from-hedge-fundstardom.html [https://perma.cc/PGM7-9WTF].
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thereby a financial asset. 55 The traditional critique of using such a
method in normal times is that it would have a deleterious effect on
incentives to work and save—that is, to create economic value. 56 The
idea that such an approach could be an effective tool when other
monetary tools prove dull, however, has received support from a
number of influential figures in the post-GFC era. 57 In one sense, of
course, it is obvious that giving people money to spend may be an
effective response when a severe recession has threatened or already
begun—this, after all, was one rationale for the stimulus checks
Congress sent out during the recent pandemic. 58
There are fundamental differences, however, between those
stimulus checks and Omarova’s proposal. As Christine Desan observes,
there is a
double standard separating fiscal and monetary initiatives [that] follows in part from the
structure of spending: public spending depends on a political process while monetary
outlays draw on administrative practice. . . . [And e]ven as [the Fed] commits funds, they
do not “count” against the tally of national debt. By contrast, when Congress spends, it
first borrows by way of issuing a Treasury bill or bond, which adds to the national debt. 59

Another way of putting the point is that Congress only gets to
spend money that’s already been created: it must either borrow or tax
in order to effect fiscal outlays. 60 The Federal Reserve creates money by
55. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1259–63. Note that Omarova’s proposal is sensitive to
distributional concerns but explicitly geared toward providing the Fed with a tool to affect
aggregate demand in the economy. As Omarova notes, the term “helicopter money” comes from a
Milton Friedman essay. MILTON FRIEDMAN, THE OPTIMUM QUANTITY OF MONEY (1969), reprinted
in THE OPTIMUM QUANTITY OF MONEY AND OTHER ESSAYS 4 (2006); see also Kevin Dowd, Against
Helicopter Money, 38 CATO J. 147, 147 (Winter 2018), https://www.cato.org/cato-journal/winter2018/against-helicopter-money [https://perma.cc/363R-NHHV] (“Friedman did not intend his
suggestion as a serious policy proposal. Instead, he intended it as a classroom device to illustrate
the consequences of changes in the stock of base money.”).
56. See, e.g., RICKS, supra note 14, at 150–51.
57. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, What Tools Does the Fed Have Left? Part 3: Helicopter Money,
BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/04/11/whattools-does-the-fed-have-left-part-3-helicopter-money/ [https://perma.cc/Z5LH-FB88] (“In recent
years,” with interest rates stuck near zero and legislatures reluctant to spend, “Milton Friedman’s
idea of money-financed (as opposed to debt-financed) tax cuts –’helicopter money’– has received a
flurry of attention, with influential advocates including Adair Turner, Willem Buiter, and Jordi
Gali”).
58. See, e.g., CTR. BUDGET POL’Y PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: FISCAL STIMULUS (May 21, 2020)
https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/fiscal-stimulus [https://perma.cc/4MTK-G3R3].
59. Desan, supra note 13, at 8.
60. Ben Bernanke observes that “fiscal expansion financed by money creation”—i.e.,
helicopter money—is likely to be more effective at boosting spending than an equivalent
magnitude of debt-financed fiscal expansion. See Bernanke, supra note 57:
[W]hen a spending increase or tax cut is paid for by debt issuance, as in the standard
case, future debt service costs and thus future tax burdens rise. To the extent that
households today anticipate that increase in taxes—or if they simply become more
cautious when they hear that the national debt has increased—they will spend less
today, offsetting some of the program’s expansionary effect. In contrast, a fiscal
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purchasing or lending against financial assets with newly
created dollars.
It is worth pausing to emphasize that because the assets the Fed
acquires when it creates money pay a higher interest rate than what
the Fed pays on its liabilities, it generates enormous profits, and its
balance sheet is “solvent.” 61 This is generally understood to be a good
thing, in part because the Fed is able to remit to the Treasury, after
paying for its own operations, all of its considerable profits, thereby
reducing the public debt. 62
Notice, however, what helicopter drops do: they create new
money without the purchase of financial assets. This new money would
amount to a liability of the Fed, but the Fed would not thereby acquire
a corresponding asset. 63 Depending on the extent of such helicopter
drops, it is possible that the Fed’s liabilities would exceed its assets—in
other words, the Fed could be “insolvent.” I use scare quotes here
because this is not quite the problem it may at first seem to be: unlike
banks, the Fed faces no limit on its ability to generate new dollars, and
therefore cannot default. While insolvency does not matter for the Fed
in the same way that it would matter for any other institution, it is not
clear to me what the systemic knock-on effects might be; I would very
much like to have seen an exploration of this question in The People’s
Ledger. 64 Of course, it is possible that Omarova would respond that we
should limit helicopter drops to ensure that they did not push the Fed
into insolvency, but this, too, would seem to demand some analysis and
justification: how much should we expect such a limitation to blunt the
expansion financed by money creation does not increase the government debt or
households’ future tax payments and so should provide a greater impetus to household
spending, all else equal.
61. “Solvency” here means simply that the value of the Fed’s assets exceeds its liabilities. See
Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FED. RSRV. STAT. RELEASE (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/20211028/ [https://perma.cc/3F52-RMK4] (showing
that as of October 28, 2021, on a balance sheet of more than eight trillion dollars, the Fed’s assets
exceeded its liabilities by almost forty billion dollars).
62. See, e.g., Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Board
Announces Reserve Bank Income Data and Transfers to Treasury for 2020 (Jan. 11, 2021),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20210111a.htm
[https://perma.cc/5ZBF-8QGB] (providing data for the past ten years on Fed remittances to the
Department of the Treasury, including $88.5 billion in 2020).
63. Kevin Dowd, in a piece critical of such approaches, observes that if for technical
accounting reasons the Fed needed to buy assets to create money, it could buy perpetual zerocoupon bonds—that is, bonds that never require any payments whatsoever from the “borrower.”
Dowd, supra note 55, at 150. He acknowledges, however, that the actual impact would be that the
Fed would wind up with negative equity (or “capital”) on its balance sheet. Id. at 155–57.
64. Other critiques of helicopter money tend to focus on political legitimacy—a question I
take up again below—or the fiscal impact of the approach, which assumes the continued debt
financing of fiscal outlays. See, e.g., id.; see also Bernanke, supra note 57.
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effectiveness of helicopter drops as a monetary tool, and what costs are
we trying to avoid by prioritizing balance sheet solvency for the Fed?
In any event, if one can get comfortable with the idea of negative
equity on the Fed’s balance sheet, it opens up the possibility of
monetary reform potentially much more radical than what Professor
Omarova proposes here. Why, for example, should congressional
spending rely on already created dollars at all? Why not allow for direct
fiscal expenditures, so that when Congress spends, new money is
created? There is precedent for this: during the Civil War, the Union
government famously issued “greenbacks,” which were “sovereign IOUs
[used] to pay soldiers and suppliers,” and which “entered and lubricated
the civilian market.” 65 Fiscal expenditures of the federal government
could then result in direct credits to the FedAccounts of suppliers of
goods and services, or recipients of transfer payments, with no need to
borrow or tax, and no purchase of any financial assets that would
provide an income stream to the Federal Reserve. Indeed, why not
retire the idea of “transfer” payments and effect Social Security
payments and Medicare reimbursements as direct fiscal
helicopter drops?
To be clear, I am not suggesting that this approach would not
have costs, and perhaps significant costs that would counsel against
adopting it—but it would seem to demand careful analysis if our goal is
to reform our monetary system to make it more democratic. 66 Without
pretending to provide such analysis, a preliminary point worth noting
is that because “the amount of sovereign debt that a community issues
to pay for public needs . . . bears no necessary resemblance to the
amount of money that its citizens might wish to hold as a medium for
their own use,” 67 the Fed would still have a central role to play in
modulating the money supply.
It also worth addressing a second common objection to helicopter
drops, if only because Omarova deals with it in such a creative way.
Specifically, modulating the money supply requires not only a tool to
augment money—which helicopter drops can clearly do—but also a tool
to drain money out of the economy 68—for which helicopter drops seem

65. Desan, supra note 13, at 13.
66. Without endorsing this view, one can imagine a line of attack positing that debt-financing,
and the attendant need to tax, imposes some constraints on fiscal expenditures, and that such
expenditures should be constrained at a certain point due to concerns about crowding out private
investment, with all its “Hayekian” comparative advantages over government investment.
67. Desan, supra note 13, at 13.
68. Monetary contraction is called for when the economy is “overheating” and inflation
threatens. For a good intuitive account of why a healthy economy requires modulation of the money
supply, see Paul Krugman, Babysitting the Economy, SLATE (Aug. 14, 1998),
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less well adapted. If all money is held in account form, it would of course
be straightforward to debit everyone’s accounts, but even if one can find
a “fair” way to do so, people will be angered by seeing their account
balances diminished by an administrative process. Furthermore, it can
have a profoundly disruptive effect on people’s plans; and to the degree
there are alternatives such as physical cash, the mere risk of such a
move would cause savvy persons to migrate out of FedAccounts ahead
of the move.
Omarova comes up with an ingenious proposal to try to address
these issues. In effect, she proposes putting money into abeyance rather
than into permanent retirement: each FedAccount holder—with
various carve-outs 69—would have a portion of their account balance
placed into escrow, where it would not be lost but could not be spent for
some period of time, either. 70 The escrowed funds would receive a higher
rate of interest than spendable account balances. 71 The beauty of this
proposal is that it could mitigate the outrage people would likely feel if
their
nominal
money
balance
were
diminished
by
administrative procedure.
While I applaud the ingenuity of this proposal, I remain
unpersuaded of its wisdom or necessity, even if we were to adopt
helicopter drops as a means of augmenting the money supply. First,
most businesses and individuals hold money primarily as a “transaction
reserve”—that is, a medium of exchange to meet near-term
transactional obligations, such as paying rent or (for businesses)
workers’ wages. 72 While there are doubtless many who maintain a large
balance in their bank accounts that they do not plan to spend in the
near term, there are also many—and not just the less wealthy—who for
very good reasons simultaneously try to minimize the amount they hold
in transaction reserves, while ensuring that they can meet their nearterm obligations. 73 An escrow system could be extremely disruptive and

http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_dismal_science/1998/08/babysitting_the_economy.sing
le.html [https://perma.cc/7Q9Y-PYFZ].
69. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1262.
70. Id. at 1261–63.
71. Id. at 1262.
72. See RICKS, supra note 14, at 42–46.
73. See, e.g., John Crawford, Shining a Light on Shadow Money, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
185, 193 (2016) (“Consider a firm with some visibility into its near-term payment obligations; the
firm wants to ensure it can meet these obligations but does not want to devote any more to this
end than is necessary, since holding claims in a transaction reserve diverts resources from the
firm’s central profit-generating activities.”).
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distortive for these account holders. 74 Omarova recognizes this, writing,
“to avoid or minimize unnecessarily harsh liquidity shocks, especially
on small businesses and vulnerable individuals, it would be important
for the Fed to communicate its intentions clearly and continuously, with
as much advance warning as possible.” 75
To the degree advance warning mitigates disruption, however,
it may exacerbate two different problems. First, as account holders are
told to expect an escrowing of their balances, they may try to spend
down their account by accelerating purchases, thus stoking the
inflationary pressures the Fed wishes to suppress. Second, there are at
least two ways that such a system could be arbitraged based on the
parameters set out in the article: Omarova explicitly allows for (1)
physical cash and (2) certain accounts at community development
banks to persist in her proposed system. 76 If people expected monetary
tightening, there would presumably be a rush into these other types of
money, which would not be subject to the escrow process. Granted,
Omarova proposes caps on account size for the residual private
accounts, 77 but one could imagine a system of deposit brokers arising to
arbitrage that limitation. I have no doubt that there are regulatory
reactions that could attempt to address all these issues—ever-more
nuanced carve-outs for certain FedAccounts holders; withdrawal limits
for physical cash; a ban on brokered deposits. And it is true that one
could object to virtually any regulatory reform proposal by pointing to
the inevitability of regulatory arbitrage and unintended consequences,
and that such objections are too often made in a facile or lazy manner.
In some situations, however, one does fear that a system designed to
address such concerns may begin to look like a Rube Goldberg machine.
Happily, though, I do not believe a system of helicopter drops
needs to wrestle with these issues, unless such drops become the sole
(or primary) method of creating money. Omarova writes that “[t]his tool
is to be reserved only for extreme and rare circumstances, when the Fed
is unable to control inflation by raising interest rates and deploying its

74. Delay in accessing money can be as disruptive as a “haircut” for many depositors. For
example, right before the failure of Washington Mutual in 2008, even depositors under the deposit
insurance cap engaged in run-like behavior—not because they were afraid of losing their money,
but because “any interruptions would cause real problems in [their] li[ves].” E. Scott Reckard,
Deposit Run at WaMu Forced Their Hand, Regulators Say, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2008),
https://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2008/09/just-as-with-in.html [https://perma.cc/YL6PL55R].
75. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1262.
76. Id. at 1263–64, 1267 (referring to the continued existence of physical cash); id. at 1265–
66 (describing savings accounts to be offered by community banking institutions).
77. Id. at 1265 n.154.
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new asset-side tools.” 78 But it is hard to imagine a significant technical
limitation on the Fed’s ability to control inflation using its other tools,
given that it would be directly administering the rate of interest on
NDW loans and on FedAccounts themselves, and given the vast
quantity of assets it could sell (NIA and Treasury securities) or allow to
“run off” (NDW loans) if it wanted to contract the money supply. The
constraint on raising interest rates has traditionally been political, 79
but the political headwinds to debiting or escrowing individual
FedAccounts would likely be much stronger. In short, I believe that
even if helicopter drops were adopted to augment the money supply, it
may be better to eschew directly debiting or escrowing FedAccounts as
a means of monetary contraction.
II. STABILITY AND BUBBLES
The expanded open market operations Omarova proposes are
motivated in large part by a recognition of the disruptive and distortive
effects of bubbles. Omarova mentions two bubbles from recent
memory—housing and tech stocks 80—in suggesting the types of asset
classes OMO Plus short positions may target. But the bursting of these
two bubbles—tech stocks in 2000 and housing in 2007–09—had
profoundly different economic fallouts, despite the fact that first-order
paper losses on each asset class were of similar magnitude. 81 The
bursting of the tech stock bubble caused a very minor recession and no
disruptions to the financial system; the bursting of the housing bubble
in 2008 created immense systemic disruptions and caused a deep and
scarring recession. 82 Why the different outcomes?
Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke has argued
persuasively that the principal difference was that the housing bubble
caused a financial panic, primarily in the shadow banking sector, while

78. Id. at 1261.
79. See generally Tooze, supra note 10.
80. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1276.
81. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Speech at the
Russell Sage Foundation and The Century Foundation Conference on “Rethinking Finance”: Some
Reflections
on
the
Crisis
and
the
Policy
Response
(Apr.
13,
2012),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm
[https://perma.cc/JM6C-877N] (observing that the peak-to-trough losses on all residential real
estate in the United States from 2006 through 2011 was on the order of seven trillion dollars; the
paper losses on stock-market wealth in the wake of the dot-com bust was on the order of eight
trillion dollars).
82. Id.
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the tech bubble did not. 83 Specifically, losses from the housing crash
were relatively concentrated among highly leveraged (mostly
noncommercial bank) financial intermediaries that funded themselves
with very short-term debt, whose claimants had no tolerance for losses
and could easily withdraw their funding. 84 When they withdrew en
masse, it was the structural equivalent of a “run” on the bank. The
essence of a financial panic is widespread runs. Since the GFC, there
have been myriad explanations of why panics are profoundly damaging
to the economy, 85 and I will not attempt to rehearse them here—
particularly since I do not think Omarova disagrees with me on the
importance of panic prevention. Indeed, this is a large part of why she
argues that migration to FedAccounts should be mandatory. 86 If panics
are the problem, and panics are defined by runs on private deposits and
deposit substitutes, why not eliminate such instruments?
Given Omarova’s radical move with respect to bank accounts, I
am left wondering why she does not adopt a similar prohibitory
approach with respect to deposit substitutes—the lifeblood of the
shadow banking industry. Professor Morgan Ricks, for example, has
argued persuasively that it is not only desirable but eminently feasible
to force all entities who offer the functional equivalents of deposits to
get a bank charter and comply with bank regulations, or to desist. 87 And
it is the shadow banking instruments, not insured deposits, that were
at the heart of both the GFC and the market disruptions of
March 2020. 88
Omarova does not propose a prohibition on shadow banking,
however; rather, she argues that the other parts of her proposal would

83. Id. (“[A] key vulnerability of the system was the heavy reliance of the shadow banking
sector, as well as some of the largest global banks, on various forms of short-term wholesale
funding, including commercial paper, repos, securities lending transactions, and interbank
loans[.]”).
84. Id. Of course, losses also fell heavily on homeowners. Note that Atif Mian and Amir Sufi
have argued that the more important distinguishing factor between the two crashes is that losses
in the housing crash disproportionately hit those with a much higher marginal propensity to
consume—i.e., lower-income, highly leveraged homeowners. See ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE
OF DEBT 19–21 (2014). For an assessment of the debate between those who side with Bernanke
and those who side with Mian and Sufi, see Crawford, supra note 73, at 197–202.
85. See John Crawford, Safe Money, 104 MARQ. L. REV. 411, 425–31 (2020); see also Ben S.
Bernanke, The Real Effects of Disrupted Credit: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/Bernanke_final-draft.pdf.
86. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1264 (“Universal availability of fully sovereign digital money
will make it much easier for all bank depositors to ‘run to safety’ in real time, thus taking the
classic bank run problem to the next level.”).
87. RICKS, supra note 14, at 223–47.
88. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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effectively crowd out shadow banking. 89 For example, in her discussion
of securities firms, key players in shadow banking activities, she
suggests that a sine qua non of most of the mischief they make is
institutional affiliation with insured depository institutions:
[S]ecurities dealers continuously fuel the ever-increasing volumes of trading in secondary
financial markets—and the accompanying growth in the system-wide levels of leverage,
risk, and interconnectedness. As emphasized throughout this discussion, the critical
factor enabling securities firms to conduct these activities on such a massive scale is their
institutional affiliation with federally-insured banks. Through organizational attachment
to banks, securities dealers gain access to—and a significant degree of de facto control
over—the flow of the sovereign public’s full faith and credit powering the
financial system. 90

Whatever the demerits of close institutional ties between
commercial banks and investment banks, however, I am not persuaded
that they are as critical as Omarova implies in creating systemic
instability. After all, Lehman Brothers did not have a commercial
banking affiliate. 91 Neither did Bear Stearns nor many of the other
entities at the core of the GFC. 92
Furthermore, the arguments Omarova offers for banning
private deposits—the risk of a “run to safety” in crisis and the incentives
banks would have to offer higher interest rates matched with a “broader
suite of high-risk, high-return financial products” 93—seem to me to
apply a fortiori to the shadow banking sector, where institutions are
less constrained by the prudential rules that apply to banks. 94

89. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1288–99.
90. Id. at 1297.
91. The run on Lehman Brothers and its bankruptcy filing were a fulcrum point in the GFC.
See generally NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 324–43 (Jan. 2011) [https://perma.cc/Q36H-5PRW].
92. Bear Stearn experienced a run and would have failed absent government intervention to
facilitate and subsidize its purchase by JP Morgan. See id. at 280–91. For an account of other
entities without banking affiliates that either experienced runs or likely would have absent
government backstops, see id. at 344–86.
93. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1264.
94. It is of course hard to tease out the contribution of affiliation to current implicit
guarantees given that the largest independent investment banks in the US are all now part of
bank holding companies, having either failed (Lehman), been bought by bank holding companies
(Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns), or converted into bank holding companies (Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley) in 2008. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE
U.S., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 280–91, 324–43, 353–86 (2011) [https://perma.cc/PGC7DTC3]. But it is certainly plausible that the Fed’s intervention into repurchase agreements
markets in March 2020, for example, would have covered (and would have needed to cover) entities
like Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns if they existed as they did in 2008. See Jeff Cox, Fed Pumps
$198 Billion into Short-term Bank Funding Operations Amid Big Demand, CNBC (Mar. 12, 2020,
2:26 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/12/fed-pumps-198-billion-into-short-term-repo-bankfunding-operations.html [https://perma.cc/2492-JS59].
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If it’s true that the shadow banking sector is less constrained in
catering to customers than commercial banks, then it is plausible that
the “crowding out” effect of FedAccounts would operate with more force
on commercial bank deposits than on shadow banking instruments—
implying that a direct ban of deposits is less necessary than a direct ban
of deposit substitutes. 95 And of course one of the primary lessons of the
GFC is that deposit substitutes issued by shadow banks can be as much
or more of a panic-prone source of funding as commercial bank deposits,
strengthening this conclusion. 96
In the end, in a well-designed FedAccounts program, a “crowding
out” approach may suffice to address potential problems with both
deposits and deposit substitutes. But if a deposit ban is needed, then it
seems a prohibition on the deposit substitutes of the shadow banking
system is needed even more.
III. SEIGNIORAGE
Institutions that issue deposits or deposit substitutes to fund
themselves—viz., banks and shadow banks—have a lower cost of
funding than those that do not. This is “[b]ecause cash equivalent
instruments satisfy money demand,” and so “are a source of
extraordinarily cheap funding to their issuers.” 97 The issuers of these
instruments then “reap the rewards that come with having created the
medium that provides cash services” 98 in the form of interest payments
on the assets that were purchased as part of the money creation process.
When the Fed engages in this process, the earnings are called
“seigniorage,” or fiscal profits from money creation. 99

95. On the regulation of banks, see, e.g., RICKS, supra note 14, at 5:
No other industry [than banking] is subject to remotely comparable regulatory constraints an
oversight. In the United States, deposit banks face detailed chartering criteria; strict limitations
on permissible activities and investments; leverage limits (capital requirements); special
restrictions on affiliations and affiliate transactions; base money reserve requirements; extensive
onsite supervision; a vigorous enforcement regime; special receivership regime in the event of
failure; and so on.
96. See, e.g., Jack Bao, Josh David & Song Han, The Runnables, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RSRV. SYS. (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/fedsnotes/2015/the-runnables-20150903.html [https://perma.cc/BHH3-V7W5]; see also GARY B.
GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING 7 (2012)
(“The financial crisis of 2007–8 was also a bank run, but it was not people who ran to their banks
but firms running on investment banks.”).
97. Ricks et al., supra note 26, at 141; see also Robin Greenwood, Samuel G. Hanson & Jeremy
C. Stein, A Comparative-Advantage Approach to Government Debt Maturity, 70 J. FIN. 1683, 1709
(2015).
98. Desan, supra note 13, at 19.
99. Ricks et al., supra note 26, at 141.
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Money creation can be understood as a public good; 100 it seems
appropriate, therefore, for seigniorage to flow to the public treasury.
We may then ask why we allow banks and shadow banks to siphon off
this seigniorage that should flow to the public. Such a system is not
inevitable; one of the features of FedAccounts that my coauthors and I
propose elsewhere would be the recapture of seigniorage revenues for
the public purse. 101 Discount window loans could replace lost deposit
funding for banks but would not be issued at a “preferential” rate. 102
Omarova proposes that NDW loans in her system would be issued at a
“preferential” rate, 103 but she does not explain why such subsidies
should continue.
The obvious objection to removing these subsidies is that a
higher cost of funding for banks could translate into less lending for the
real economy. The hurdle rate for new lending by a bank, however, is
not the average cost of funds but the marginal cost of funds—how much
a bank would need to pay to borrow an extra dollar that it then turned
around to lend. 104 The marginal cost of funds for banks is the fed funds
rate, not the interest rate the bank pays on deposits. 105
Eliminating the seigniorage subsidy for banks should not cause
the fed funds rate to rise, and even if it did, the Fed could then, if looser
monetary policy were called for, target the fed funds rate directly. It is
not, however, obvious that a looser monetary policy would be needed:
assuming arguendo that eliminating bank subsidies would lead to a
contraction in lending, this would, as Professor Adam Levitin has
argued, amount to a “right-sizing, because the level of credit would
reflect risk-internalized pricing rather than subsidization.” 106 And if we
thought that certain categories of borrowers needed subsidies, a far
more sensible approach would be to subsidize them in a targeted way—
as we already do, for example, with student loans and residential
mortgages—instead of subsidizing banks willy-nilly in the hope that
they will pass on some (small) percentage of these subsidies. 107

100. Id. at 128 n.77.
101. Id. at 140–41.
102. Id. at 143 (“The Central Bank should charge actuarially fair rates for its discount window
loans.”).
103. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1271.
104. Ricks et al., supra note 26, at 147–49.
105. Id.
106. Adam J. Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 427
(2016) (making this point in the context of a proposal that would prohibit fractional reserve
banking).
107. Ricks et al., supra note 26, at 148–49.

76

VAND. L REV. EN BANC

[Vol. 75:55

In short, one of the best ways to democratize the monetary
system would be to recapture seigniorage revenues for the
public benefit.
IV. DEMOCRATIZING MONEY
As noted, what the Fed has been doing with its balance sheet
since the GFC has a profound and underexplored political dimension to
it. It seems entirely appropriate to highlight this fact and to call, as
Omarova does, for a more democratic approach. There are, however, at
least two ways to understand what democratizing the Fed and its
balance sheet might mean: (1) increasing the political accountability of
monetary decision makers or (2) ensuring the distributional benefits of
the monetary system accrue to the broader public. 108 The latter appears
to be what Professor Omarova mostly has in mind, though she also
writes that “the proposed restructuring would democratize not only
access to financial services but also the very process of generation and
allocation of financial resources.” 109 It is unclear to me what
democratizing this process would entail. Fiscal authorities are more
directly accountable than monetary authorities in our system, and it
clear that much of the burden of Omarova’s proposal would be carried
by fiscal authorities, as with the establishment and implementation of
the NIA—but as I argue above, this does not appear to me to be
fundamentally different from how things have traditionally operated. 110
While Omarova leaves open the possibility that it could mean making
the Fed more directly politically accountable—that is, less
independent—she declines to take a position on the question. 111
If democratizing money is our goal, however, it is worth interrogating
the desirability of the Fed’s independence.
Using as a criterion of evaluation what I take to be a principal
aim of The People’s Ledger—reducing the inequality flowing from the
current system of money creation and payments—I will argue that Fed
independence should not be cast aside lightly. I will then explore how
108. To “democratize” may mean to (1) “introduce a democratic system or democratic principles
to” or as to (2) “make (something) accessible to everyone.” Democratize, LEXICO,
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/democratize
(last
visited
Jan.
11,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/Q3XN-WNGL]. Elaborating on the first definition, “democratic” may be defined
as “based on a form of government in which people choose leaders by voting.” Democratic,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democratic (last visited Jan.
11, 2022) [https://perma.cc/ZHG8-KY8A].
109. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1237 (emphasis added).
110. See supra Section I.A.
111. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1282 n.223 (noting that parts of her proposal “could potentially
raise questions about the Fed’s political independence, which are beyond the Article’s scope”).
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stable we should expect a regime of independence to be if the Fed were
assigned all the tasks The People’s Ledger proposes for it.
A. Inequality and the desirability of Fed independence
A threshold issue is what independence means for the Fed, aside
from a generic understanding that the Fed should carry out its mission
with some insulation from the immediate pressures of partisan politics.
What does Fed independence look like operationally? Without diving
too deeply into this issue, 112 it is worth highlighting, first, that the Fed,
“unlike many other public agencies, is not funded by congressional
appropriations.” 113 Instead, “[i]ts operations are financed primarily
from the interest earned on the securities it owns.” 114 Thus, while “the
Fed chairman is required to report to Congress twice a year on progress
towards the Fed’s responsibilities and monetary policy objectives,” 115
Congress lacks the leverage that the appropriations process might
otherwise provide to influence Fed policy. In term of governance more
generally, in contrast to other agencies “whose directors serve at the
pleasure of the president, [such as] the CIA and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence,”
the [Federal Reserve] Board of Governors and [the Federal Open Market Committee] are
truly independent. These entities do not report to the president, and governors (and the
presidents of the [twelve] regional Federal Reserve banks) do not serve at the pleasure of
the president. Board members are appointed for staggered [fourteen]-year terms, so every
two years a term expires, the intent being to limit the number of governors that a sitting
president could appoint . . . Section 242 of the Federal Reserve Act provides that a
governor can be removed by the president only “ ‘for cause,’ ” which is usually meant to
mean incompetence, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office. 116

It is of course true that Fed independence is not a binary
question but a matter of degree. The Fed could be vulnerable to
legislative changes, and its leaders, in contrast to federal judges, do not
enjoy life tenure. Further, as Omarova observes, “in our democratic
112. For a detailed and nuanced treatment of this topic, see PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER

AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2017).

113. Who Owns The Federal Reserve?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS. (March 1,
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_14986.htm [https://perma.cc/CQM8-WA34].
OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
6,
114. FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/pf_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF4P-R46W].
115. Robert Eisenbeis, Can The President Fire The Chairman of the Federal Reserve?,
CUMBERLAND ADVISORS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.cumber.com/market-commentary/canpresident-fire-chairman-federal-reserve [https://perma.cc/X4A3-VB3X].
116. Id. On the president’s power to fire board members, see also Peter Conti-Brown, What
Happens If Trump Tries To Fire Fed Chair Jerome Powell?, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/09/09/what-happens-if-trump-tries-to-fire-fedchair-jerome-powell/ [https://perma.cc/CD7U-VXTZ].
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society, institutional independence is an inherently complex and
context-dependent phenomenon.” 117 At the same time, it seems clear
that relative to other federal agencies, the Fed enjoys a high degree of
independence of action.
The next question that arises is, what is so great about Fed
independence? Why not make the Fed more directly and democratically
accountable? Adam Tooze, for example, has questioned the assumptions
that underlay the countermajoritarian model of the Fed:
The model [of independence] was also based on a jaundiced vision of modern history and
more or less explicitly at odds with democratic politics: first in the sense that it made
cynical assumptions about the motivations of voters and politicians but also in the more
general sense that in the place of debate, collective agreement, and choice, it favored
technocratic calculation, institutional independence, and nondiscretionary rules. 118

Writing in May 2020, Tooze argued that most of the key
assumptions of the traditional countermajoritarian view of the Fed no
longer apply, above all the assumption that inflation is a threat. On the
contrary, Tooze averred that “the fight against inflation was won.
Indeed, it was won so decisively that economists now ask themselves
whether the basic organizing idea of a trade-off between inflation and
unemployment any longer obtains.” 119 If this is true, then it may seem
that a principal justification for Fed independence evaporates.
I remain unpersuaded by this line of argument for several
reasons, however. First, in the latter half of 2021, concerns about
inflation came roaring back. 120 Second, inflation is not the only
monetary threat we face. In the decade after the GFC, the independent
Fed proved to be an aggressive enemy of deflation, 121 in ways that
117. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1282 n.223.
118. Tooze, supra note 10.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Jeanna Smialek, Lingering Virus, Lasting Inflation: A Fed Official Explains Her
Pivot, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/21/business/economy/marydaly-federal-reserve-inflation.html [https://perma.cc/AG6H-8CW9]; Jeff Cox, Yellen Sees Inflation
Staying Higher for the Next Several Months, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2021, 1:13 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/05/yellen-sees-inflation-staying-higher-for-the-next-severalmonths.html [https://perma.cc/AV7W-EEPN]; see also Masahiro Okoshi, Interview: China’s Yuan
Likely to Become Asia’s Central Currency: Kenneth Rogoff, NIKKEI ASIA (Aug. 10, 2021, 4:32 AM),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/China-s-yuan-likely-to-become-Asia-s-centralcurrency-Kenneth-Rogoff [https://perma.cc/XV87-GWDC ] (quoting economist Ken Rogoff arguing
against those who would say “ ‘[w]ell, let’s make everything free for everyone, and we can just
borrow. Interest rates will never go up.’ . . . Everyone is treating that like that’s forever. If the U.S.
political system believes in itself too much, [then it takes] a big risk”).
121. Above all, it kept its target interest rate near zero for almost seven years after the
financial crisis and engaged in unprecedented asset purchases termed “quantitative easing.” See,
RSRV.
OF
ST.
LOUIS,
e.g.,
Federal
Funds
Effective
Rate,
FED.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FEDFUNDS (last visited Nov. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VUB68MG9 ] (showing that the Fed Funds rate remained near zero for nearly seven years, from the end
of 2008 through the end of 2015, and again for over a year from March 2020 through the time of
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invited intense criticism from market, academic, and political
figures, 122 and which would likely have been much harder to accomplish
had the Fed been more directly politically accountable.
The question may then arise of why we need fear inflation and
deflation. Put another way, is price stability important, and if so, why?
And if it is important, is central bank independence really necessary to
achieve it?
A number of thoughtful monetary economists and policymakers
have written recently on the importance of price stability as a means of
mitigating inequality (while also arguing that inequality is primarily a
structural rather than monetary phenomenon). 123 For example, Agustín
Carstens, General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements,
writes that
over the long run, inequality is not a monetary phenomenon, though central banks’
actions can have an impact on the distribution of wealth and income over shorter horizons.
Prolonged periods of high inflation and recessions can hurt the economy and
disproportionately hit the most disadvantaged. Therefore, the best contribution monetary

this writing); Elizabeth Schulze, The Fed Launched QE Nine Years Ago—These Four Charts Show
its Impact, CNBC (Nov. 24, 2017, 7:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/24/the-fed-launchedqe-nine-years-ago—these-four-charts-show-its-impact.html [https://perma.cc/AM7M-2EBH] (with
interest rates already close to zero, “[t]he Fed launched quantitative easing (QE), ultimately
buying trillions of dollars of government bonds and mortgage-backed securities. Between 2008 and
2015, the Fed’s . . . total assets ballooned from $900 billion to $4.5 trillion”); see also Ben S.
Bernanke, Chair of the Fed. Rsrv., Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic
Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming: The Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy (Aug. 27, 2010),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100827a.htm
[https://perma.cc/64QQ-KADS ] (the Federal Open Market Committee “will strongly resist
deviations from price stability in the downward direction”).
122. For an account of criticisms from members of Congress, see, for example, Sewell Chan, In
Unusual Move, Fed Bolsters Its Defense of Its Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/business/economy/18fed.html
[https://perma.cc/9EWU8RWW]. For an example of criticism from market figures and academics, signed by economists
such as Michael Boskin and John Taylor, and fund managers such as Cliff Asness and Jim Chanos,
see Open Letter from Hoover Inst. Ed. to Ben Bernanke, Chair of the Fed. Rsrv. (Nov. 15, 2010),
https://www.hoover.org/research/open-letter-ben-bernanke
[https://perma.cc/BE9B-HRZR]
(arguing that “planned asset purchases risk currency debasement and inflation”).
123. See Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Exec. Bd. of the Eur. Cent. Bank, Speech at
Conference on Diversity and Inclusion in Economics, Finance, and Central Banking: Monetary
Policy
and
Inequality
(Nov.
9,
2021),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2021/html/ecb.sp211109_2~cca25b0a68.en.html
[https://perma.cc/P4E8-RY99]; Claudio Borio, Head of the Monetary & Econ. Dep’t, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, Speech at Bank of Internationa’l Settlements Annual Meeting: The Distributional
Footprint of Monetary Policy (June 29, 2021), https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp210629a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CW6J-366B]; Agustín Carstens, Gen. Manager of the Bank of Int’l Settlements,
Comments at Markus’ Academy, Princeton University’s Bendheim Center for Finance: Central
Banks
and
Inequality
(May
6,
2021),
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp210506.htm
[https://perma.cc/5D52-2PFT]. These speakers all argue that the primary drivers of inequality are
structural and call for nonmonetary policy responses, but that monetary policy can nonetheless
serve an important role, above all in promoting price stability.
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policy can make to an equitable society is to try to keep the economy on an even keel by
fulfilling its mandate. Governments can reduce inequality through more direct fiscal and
structural policies. 124

Both high levels of inflation and the policy response required to
address it hit the least well-off the hardest. Inflation “is often rightly
portrayed as one of the most regressive taxes. The households at the
lowest end of the income spectrum are the least able to hedge against
it: their income is usually fixed in nominal terms and their savings held
in cash or bank accounts.” 125 Meanwhile, fighting inflation requires
monetary tightening that can “bring[ ] on recessions and boost[ ]
unemployment,
which
disproportionately
hit
the
most
disadvantaged households.” 126
Deflation can be even more damaging than high levels of
inflation and if left unaddressed can cause severe recessions or
depressions. 127 And again, “[a]s recessions hit, the lower-skilled
workers are typically the first to be laid off.” 128 Unlike the policy
response required to fight inflation, fighting a deflationary recession
calls for a loose monetary policy that should boost employment and
decrease income inequality. 129 Such a policy—while better overall both
for the economy and for the least well-off—may, however, exacerbate
wealth inequality. 130 Lower interest rates tend to boost the prices of
financial and real assets, and these assets are overwhelmingly held by
those who are already wealthy. 131 In short, a lack of price stability is a
primary way the monetary system may exacerbate inequality.
If price stability is important, how important is central bank
independence in achieving? In the past half century, the Fed has faced
two great battles for price stability: against inflation in the 1970s and
124. Carstens, Comments, supra note 123, at 1.
125. Id. at 4.
126. Id. at 4.
127. To take the most salient example, the Fed’s failure to fight monetary contraction and
deflation in the 1930s is widely accepted as a principal cause of the Great Depression:
The Federal Reserve’s most serious sin of omission [was] failure to stem [this] decline
in the supply of money. From the fall of 1930 through the winter of 1933, the money
supply fell by nearly [thirty] percent. The declining supply of funds reduced average
prices by an equivalent amount. This deflation increased debt burdens; distorted
economic decision-making; reduced consumption; increased unemployment; and forced
banks, firms, and individuals into bankruptcy.
Gary Richardson, The Great Depression, FED. RSRV. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great-depression [https://perma.cc/GED8-8RW6].
128. Carstens, Comments, supra note 123, at 5.
129. Borio, Speech, supra note 123, at 8.
130. Id.
131. If, for example, one can finance the purchase of a home on more favorable terms, one can
afford to pay a higher price for it, driving up the prices of homes more generally, and benefitting
those who owned homes prior to the low interest rate environment.
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early 1980s, and against deflation in the post-GFC era. In both cases
the Fed faced political headwinds that, had it been less independent,
may have undermined its efforts to stabilize prices. I have already
observed that the Fed faced significant criticism as it fought deflation
in the post-GFC decade. 132 The political and popular backlash to then
Fed Chair Paul Volcker’s campaign against inflation in the early 1980s
was arguably fiercer; as Neil Irwin recounts, Volcker’s campaign, which
required a sharp increase in interest rates,
most certainly put a bullet in the U.S. economy. . . By the time Mr. Volcker’s campaign of
monetary tightening was done, in 1982, joblessness would peak at 10.8 percent. This,
understandably, led to intense pressure on Mr. Volcker and the Fed to relent, to hold off
on the tight-money policies that had caused the deepest recession since World War II.
With interest rates over [twenty] percent, home-building activity practically came to a
halt. People who worked in construction trades mailed two-by-four pieces of lumber to Mr.
Volcker in protest. Auto dealers mailed keys to the cars for which there were no buyers.
Farmers drove their tractors around the white marble Fed building. A man with a sawedoff shotgun and other weapons, who later told police he was angry about high interest
rates, charged past guards at the Fed’s building and nearly made it to the boardroom of
the central bank before a guard tackled him. (After the incident, Mr. Volcker was assigned
a full-time security detail for the first time.) Mr. Volcker’s routine appearances on Capitol
Hill became an exercise in lawmakers of both parties attacking him. 133

This illustrates, in my view, two key points: first, that Fed
independence may be essential to accomplishing price stability; and
second, that even when the Fed confines itself to its core mandate, its
independence is fragile and should not be taken for granted.
B. The People’s Ledger and the fragility of Fed independence
The more we ask the Fed to do, however, the harder it may be to
maintain its independence over the long-term—and this is a potential
concern with some aspects of The People’s Ledger. On the one hand,
these concerns, even if correct, do not imply a rejection of much of
Omarova’s project, as key aspects of The People’s Ledger, such as the
NIA, do not require the Fed to make discretionary decisions at all; 134
132. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
133. Neil Irwin, Paul A. Volcker, Fed Chairman Who Curbed Inflation by Raising Interest
POST
(Dec.
9,
2019),
Rates,
Dies
at
92,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/2019/12/09/c744d596-1468-11e1-90481f5352187eed_story.html [https://perma.cc/U9KW-8XAY]. Note that while the intensity of the
reaction to Volcker’s interest rate hikes was likely unique, there has been popular unrest with the
Fed’s interest rate policies in other eras, as well. See, e.g., Victoria Guida, Fed, Facing Populist
Anger, Embraces ‘Those Left Behind’ by Economy, POLITICO (Aug. 9, 2019, 12:45 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/09/fed-facing-populist-anger-embraces-those-left-behindby-economy-1648020 [https://perma.cc/8LPZ-GHM2].
134. Omarova, supra note 1, at 1281 (“Public investment decisions would be left to the
Treasury and the newly created NIA.”).
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and other elements, such as helicopter drops, can be engineered so that
the discretionary decisionmaking point lies outside the Fed. 135 On the
other hand, one can imagine those sympathetic to The People’s Ledger
despairing of the ability of Congress and other more directly
accountable agencies to carry out Omarova’s vision; these allies might
then place their hope in an independent Fed. In my view, this would be
a mistake: it could undermine Fed independence and would not
guarantee better policies over the longer term.
Without denying that the Fed’s operations inevitably have some
distributional impact, 136 we should query what the results might be if
the Fed’s remit required it to make decisions with more direct and
transparent distributional effects. Here I am reminded of a tale of the
philosopher Sidney Morgenbesser, who had been in the middle of
student riots at Columbia University in 1968 and been “clobbered” by
police. 137 Years later, he was called up for jury duty and during voir dire
was asked if he had ever been treated “unjustly or unfairly” by police. 138
He replied, “I’ve been treated unjustly but not unfairly. They were
clobbering everybody.” 139 Here we may have the opposite problem: even
if the decisions the Fed makes are just according to our standards, to
the degree they are perceived as “unfair” by (some) citizens, it will
undermine the Fed’s legitimacy with (some portion of) the populace. It’s
one thing when market actors bet against your most highly valued
personal asset; it would be quite another if the Fed did it. 140 Similarly,
135. Ben Bernanke argues that helicopter drops can be arranged in such a way that the
allocative decisionmaking locus rests outside the Fed—something that strikes me as harmonious
with the overall approach of The People’s Ledger. Bernanke concerned that the Fed lacks the
political legitimacy to make the direct allocative decisions that helicopter drops may require,
proposes as a potential way to address this that we:
Ask Congress to create, by statute, a special Treasury account at the Fed, and to give
the Fed (specifically, the Federal Open Market Committee) the sole authority to “ ‘fill’ ”
the account, perhaps up to some prespecified limit. At almost all times, the account
would be empty; the Fed would use its authority to add funds to the account only when
the [Federal Open Market Committee] assessed that [a helicopter drop] of specified size
was needed to achieve the Fed’s employment and inflation goals. Should the Fed act,
under this proposal, the next step would be for the Congress and the Administration—
through the usual, but possibly expedited, legislative process—to determine how to
spend the funds (for example, on a tax rebate or on public works).
Bernanke, supra note 57.
136. Lower interest rates, for example, benefit borrowers at the expense of savers, and vice
versa for higher rates.
137. David Shatz, ‘Yeah, Yeah’: Eulogy for Sidney Morgenbesser, Philosopher with a Yiddish
Accent, TABLET (June 26, 2014), https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/arts-letters/articles/sidneymorgenbesser [https://perma.cc/T7YU-BWLM].
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See supra Section I.B (critiquing the idea of the Fed taking a short position on residential
real estate through OMO Plus when it determines that the housing market is running too hot).
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it is one thing when those who face elections every two, four, or six years
make political determinations about who is eligible or ineligible to
receive stimulus checks; 141 it would be another thing if unelected
officials make these determinations in implementing “helicopter drops.”
A second question that arises overlaps with the first: how
confident can Omarova’s allies be that Fed policymakers will share
their commitments over the long term? Even if everyone agrees on some
version of “equality” as an allocative criterion, for example, that could
mean very different things to different people. Drawing an analogy to
constitutional law, one group of Fed policymakers may adopt an
“anticlassification” approach, in which it is wrong to take into account
factors such as gender and race when considering the distributive
effects of money creation. 142 Another school may adopt an
“antisubordination” approach, based on a recognition of inequality in
the economic opportunities available for certain demographic groups,
and demand a remedial approach that takes these factors into account
in order to promote equality. 143
But the problems go deeper than that: at least in the “equality”
example there is a nod towards (a kind of) impartiality, and this may
impose salutary, if highly imperfect, constraints on decisionmaking.
What if, however, those constraints are eroded? There is a famous
experiment at daycare centers in which monetary fines were introduced
for parents arriving late to pick up their children, with the result that
late pick-ups increased markedly. 144 The fines imposed an economic cost
on late pick-ups, but the psychological impact apparently was to make
late arrivals morally permissible in a way they had not been hither
thereto. 145 The effect was such that late arrivals did not abate after the
fines were removed. 146 The analogy is not, of course, perfect, but by
telling the Fed, “Your decisions are political—act like it!,” the impact
may be to remove the psychological imperative to appear neutral. This
141. See, e.g., Tim Breene, These Taxpayers Won’t Get Stimulus Checks. That’s Unjust, CNN
BUS. PERSP. (March 26, 2020, 3:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/26/perspectives/stimuluschecks-undocumented-taxpayers/index.html [https://perma.cc/CNR9-RGUM].
142. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (“Roughly speaking, this
principle holds that the government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on
the basis of a forbidden category: for example, their race.”).
143. Id. at 9 (“Antisubordination theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot
be realized under conditions of pervasive social stratification and argue that law should reform
institutions and practices that enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed
groups.”).
144. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2000).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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could increase transparency but still have a highly toxic effect on Fed
independence and decisionmaking. We can imagine one set of Fed
decisionmakers setting collateral eligibility requirements under the
NDW to heavily disfavor those corporations that fail to provide for
direct employee representation on their board of directors; 147 and
another set of Fed decisionmakers setting collateral eligibility
requirements to heavily disfavor corporations that “abus[e] their
positions to advance left-wing social policies.” 148
It seems, in other words, that even if we try to maintain some
degree of Fed independence, it would be unstable in this regime, with a
large percentage of people at any given moment—sometimes
conservatives, sometimes progressives—antagonistic toward such
independence. 149 And in trying to insulate the Fed’s decisions from the
dysfunctions of partisan politics, such a regime would eventually infect
the Fed with the same dysfunctions.
C. Other implications
The astute reader will remember, of course, that the Fed as it
currently operates does not confine itself to traditional monetary
policy. 150 Its massive intervention into markets since the GFC have
been driven partly by the challenges posed when recession threatens
and interest rates are already at zero, 151 partly by its need to prevent

147. See Press Release, Senator Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable
Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warrenintroduces-accountable-capitalism-act [https://perma.cc/YQ3T-9WMR] (proposing to require U.S.
corporations to permit employees to select at least forty percent of company directors).
148. Press Release, Marco Rubio, New Rubio Bill Helps Shareholders Fight Back Against
Woke Corporations (Sept. 23, 2021), https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/9/newrubio-bill-helps-shareholders-fight-back-against-woke-corporations
[https://perma.cc/7XF5EM75].
149. Eric Posner and Cass R. Sunstein have described a similar dynamic in other areas:
Many people vigorously defend particular institutional judgments on such issues as the
filibuster, recess appointments, executive privilege, federalism, and the role of the
courts. These judgments are defended publicly with great intensity and conviction, but
some of them turn out to be exceedingly fragile in the sense that their advocates are
prepared to change their positions as soon as their ideological commitments cut in the
other direction.
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 485 (2016).
150. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, How Big a Problem Is The Zero Lower Bound on Interest
(April
12,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/benRates?,
BROOKINGS
bernanke/2017/04/12/how-big-a-problem-is-the-zero-lower-bound-on-interest-rates/
[https://perma.cc/GT3T-U893 ] (“When short-term interest rates reach zero, further monetary
easing becomes difficult and may require unconventional monetary policy, such as large-scale
asset purchases (quantitative easing).”).
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panics in the shadow banking sector, 152 and partly by Congressional
unwillingness to authorize the full amount of aid contemplated during
the COVID-19 pandemic via direct fiscal outlays. 153 These have all
invited some degree of adverse political reaction. 154
To the degree that the Fed’s balance sheet expansion has been
driven at various times by the need to prop up the shadow banking
system, the obvious policy response, in my view, is to stamp out the
shadow banking system—that is, prohibit nonbanks (or, in Omarova’s
proposal, any private institution) from offering short-term debt claims
that function for the claimant like a deposit. 155 To the degree the Fed’s
balance sheet expansion has been driven by the need to pursue
unconventional monetary policy or respond (in cooperation with
Congress) to the COVID-19 pandemic, I believe it may be wiser for the
Fed to seek ways to cede the allocative power it has found itself
wielding, rather than doubling down on it.
Even if the Fed succeeds in ceding this power and confines itself
to its traditional functions, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will
remain independent and make the right decisions over the long term. I
would argue, however, that its independence is a prerequisite of good
monetary policy, and thus worth striving to maintain. Asking the Fed
to carry out distributive functions that other, more accountable entities
are equally qualified to perform 156 would needlessly put its
independence at risk. Even if, therefore, all the policy prescriptions in
The People’s Ledger were substantively embraced, I believe it would be
both feasible and desirable to minimize the Fed’s role.
As a final point, it is fair to ask if the same concerns regarding
independence apply to the FedAccounts proposal itself—that is,
permitting private citizens and businesses to bank directly at the Fed.
I do not think they do in any significant way. FedAccounts may pose
significant technical challenges in its implementation (relating, for
example, to privacy concerns, customer service, and cybersecurity), but
it is fairly straightforward from a policy perspective. Passing
FedAccounts would require one moment of democratic action; its

152. See supra notes 18–19.
153. See generally Menand, supra note 20.
154. See, e.g., James Politi, Fed Caught in Political Crosshairs Over Bailout Role, FIN. TIMES
(April
24,
2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/832107f4-e6d3-4dc4-adfa-c9c7338be7e3
[https://perma.cc/NVS6-F34Z]; Sewell Chan, From Tea Party Advocates, Anger at the Federal
Reserve, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/us/politics/11fed.html
[https://perma.cc/X4C9-NEL3]; see also supra note 122.
155. See supra Part II.
156. See, e.g., supra notes 134–135 and accompanying text.
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ongoing administration would require very little discretionary
decisionmaking of the sort likely to invite popular backlash. 157
CONCLUSION
While this essay has focused on points of difference, I believe The
People’s Ledger is a model of what legal scholarship should be: pushing
the envelope, thinking things through at their foundations, refusing to
take current structures for granted, and marrying deep theoretical
insight with thoughtful and informed considerations of how to
implement policies. Of equal importance, it makes a significant
contribution to our understanding of the legal dimensions of money and
monetary system design—an area too often neglected in legal
scholarship. Omarova has done as much as anyone to remedy this
neglect. The People’s Ledger serves this remedial project in its own right
and may, one hopes, do even more by drawing new scholars and
policymakers into the debate.

157. It would have discretion to set interest on reserves, but if this were a single rate it would
be unlikely to create a sense of unfairness in the general populace. See generally Ricks et al., supra
note 26.

